On War Mobilization from the Battle of British Ama Island
The question of Malvinas Islands (hereinafter referred to as Falklands) is essentially a legacy of colonialism. The Battle of Amashima is an important event in world history since World War II. On April 2, 1982, Argentine troops occupied Falklands, and Britain mobilized troops, requisitioned civilian ships, and set up a special mixed fleet to go to the South Atlantic, and the Falklands War broke out immediately. The war lasted for 74 days and ended with the surrender of the Afghan army and the British regaining control of the island. Looking back on this war, we can find that war mobilization plays an important role in the victory or defeat of the war. The strength of mobilization consciousness is related to strategic initiative. Britain, which has experienced two world wars, has a strong sense of war mobilization. The British government hyped up that the occupation of Falklands was a "shame" for Britain, and fought back for "honor" to mobilize people to support the government in sending troops. The British government also vigorously promoted Prince Andrew’s participation in the task force, and increased the mobilization effect with the influence of members of the royal family. At the same time of domestic mobilization, Britain took the lead in submitting the British-Arab conflict to the United Nations, persuaded the United Nations Security Council to adopt resolution 502, and obtained the international legal basis for wartime diplomatic and military activities. Throughout the war, Britain received supplies and a lot of information from the United States, and obtained the right to use the military base on Ascension Island. Britain also urged France to stop providing "super flag" attack aircraft and "flying fish" missiles to Argentina; Convinced Chile, which had a territorial dispute with Argentina, to provide intelligence and secret supply bases for Britain during the war. Britain tried to "get attached everywhere", but Argentina seemed "careless". In island operations, the maritime supply line cannot be broken. At this time, there were 495 merchant ships registered in the international shipping organization in Argentina, and a large number of merchant ships should have been mobilized to supplement the maritime capacity, but unfortunately, only a handful were requisitioned in wartime. Argentina set up an army of about 100,000 people and sent 13,000 people to Falklands. As a result, it was not only defeated by the eight or nine thousand British troops who landed, but also surrendered. It turned out that most of these forces mobilized by Albania had neither actual combat experience nor actual combat training, and they were quickly defeated in the face of the test of real knives and guns. The speed of mobilization affects the operational process. Falklands is located in the continental shelf along the coast of Argentina, which is only 510 kilometers away from the mainland of Argentina and 13,000 kilometers away from the mainland of Britain. When the war was launched, Argentina not only took advantage of local operations, but also took the initiative of preemption. However, this first-Mover advantage was gradually lost because of Britain’s rapid war mobilization. Margaret Thatcher, then British Prime Minister, boasted: "The rapid assembly speed of the task force will go down in British history forever." Civil ships participating in the war should not only be equipped with basic combat units such as naval communication systems and air defense weapons, but also be equipped with helicopter landing platforms, medical aid and fresh water processing equipment according to the support tasks. People did not expect that such a complicated job was basically completed by the British in 72 hours. It turned out that the British merchant ship had designed the modification scheme simultaneously when it was built. As soon as the war broke out, the relevant British departments sent the modification plan and drawings to the factory before the merchant ship arrived at the repair shop. Merchant ships can be modified quickly, and seafarers can be recruited quickly. The British government has signed a paid requisition contract with the shipping enterprises in wartime, and also signed a contract with the sailors to serve in any region. After entering the combat zone, the crew members will be paid 150% more every day, and can be temporarily transferred to active service according to the battlefield situation. The requisitioned merchant ship is still driven by the original crew and equipped with an auxiliary team of the naval fleet. This is the reason why Britain was able to quickly send more than 50 civilian ships and a large number of crew members to fight at sea after the Falklands War broke out. From April 2 to 12, there were no British armed forces in the South Atlantic. Argentina, however, failed to use this time to mobilize its air and sea power to transport personnel and materials to the island, and lost the opportunity to fight a war of attrition with the British. Opportunity knocks but once. It was not until the war broke out that Argentina woke up from a dream and stepped up its efforts to raise materials and recruit support troops. Regrettably, under the blockade of British naval and air forces, only a small amount of materials arrived in the island, which could not meet the needs of the troops guarding the island. Mobilization demand forecast influences the outcome of war. The British army initially predicted that the Falklands War would last for two months, actually 74 days; It is predicted that the landing and ground operations will last for one month, actually 25 days. The more accurate calculation provided a basis for the British war mobilization, and made the British demand and the rear supply achieve a more accurate docking. The 27,000 people in the British task force need 60 tons of food every day. Britain mobilized about 30 companies to ensure the production of these foods, and also widely used the "Arctic rations" invented before the war. "Arctic rations" are mainly high-energy and dehydrated foods, with more than 30 varieties, which can be packaged in boxes in batches, and are convenient to transport and distribute, and can be eaten both hot and cold. The island is close to the South Pole, and the climate is cold, so the troops are in urgent need of winter clothes. To this end, Britain urgently mobilized about 50 companies to adjust their production plans and rushed to produce an "Arctic combat suit" with a weight of only 0.9 kg, which enabled the task force to adapt to the local harsh climate quickly. With a huge fleet sailing more than ten thousand miles, oil supply is a big problem. Britain commandeered 21 commercial oil tankers to support the special mixed fleet, plus 8 oil tankers of the fleet itself, and the tonnage ratio of British oil tankers to surface warships was as high as 2: 1, which strongly supported the British combat operations. Due to the lack of comprehensive assessment and scientific calculation of the demand for troops in Argentina, the officers and men fighting at home are caught in the dilemma of lack of food and clothing and ammunition. 13,000 Afghan soldiers who landed on the island could only stay in tents, but there were few cold-proof tents and lacked heating equipment. Soldiers were generally not equipped with cold-proof equipment, and some even did not have military boots, resulting in frostbite or even amputation of a large number of soldiers. Most Afghan soldiers only have one field ration every day. At the height of the war, the troops guarding the island were "short of ammunition, food and cotton-padded clothes", and finally they could only drink one gruel every day, with an average of only six bullets left per person. The airport on Mashima is smaller. Before the war, Argentina did not mobilize its forces to build and expand the airport on the Falklands, resulting in its main attack aircraft "Chaojunqi" and "Tianying" only taking off from home, thus increasing the voyage by more than 800 kilometers, seriously limiting the scope of attack and the level of combat power of the Afghan Air Force. Although some officers and men of the Afghan army fought bravely, they could only swallow the bitter fruit of defeat in the end. (Author: Joint Operations College of National Defense University)